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Abstract. 
Research background: The analysis of the competitiveness between 
producers, processors and retailers in food supply chains has always been 
drawing a high level of attention. It has become even more topical issue for 
researchers and policymakers after the global food crisis in 2008.  
Purpose of the article: The goal of this paper is to analyse empirical studies 
of market power and to investigate if some supply chains are systematically 
more prone to excessive market power than others.  
Methods: For this study, we have collected a wide range of recent studies 
investigating the processors’ market power index in the food supply chains. 
In total, in our analysis, we used 472 unique market power index estimates 
and employed various linear regression models to investigate their 
determinants. 
Findings & Value added: Our findings suggest that, on average, the 
reported degree of market power in the USA is almost twice as high as in 
other countries. At the same time, market power estimates related to the 
meat, dairy and horticulture industries are systematically higher than the 
ones related to other supply chains. Finally, we observed that, on average, 
supply chains related to highly perishable products tend to have lower 
market power estimates associated with them, than other supply chains. Our 
results have important implications for future investigation of the structural 
source of market power and unfair trade practices. 
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1 Introduction 
Analysis of the market power (MP) along food supply chains have a long history in economic 
literature and it was becoming even more discussable during the last few decades due to the 
specific development of producer and consumer prices. While both consumer and producer 
food prices had increased rapidly during the global food crisis in 2007–2008,  producer prices 
quickly dropped below the pre-2007 level in 2009, consumer prices, however, remained high 
[47]. Consequently, the European Commission warned of adverse long-term effects of the 
oligopsony power of processors and retailers for the entire agri-food sector [15]. 
Even though that there were plenty approaches developed, the range of methods used 
empirically can be summarised to three main methods: Production-Theoretic Approach 
(PTA), General Identification Method (GIM) and Stochastic Frontier Estimation (SFE) 
framework. Each of these approaches has its strengths and weaknesses; describing this is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
Most of these modern empirical approaches are mainly focused on deriving and 
measuring of the level of market power. Their main drawback is that even though an estimate 
for the market power is obtained, the source of the market power is not identified, which 
limits the explanatory power of these models.  
Therefore, even though that market power has long been highly topical subject, the 
empirical research determining the level of MP remains to be scarce. While the early studies, 
using structure conduct performance, tried to bring insights on the causes of market power, 
the reliability of their estimates was heavily criticised. On the other hand, the modern 
approaches, provide more reliable market power estimates, but their ability to explain the 
causes of market power is limited. 
In this paper, we decided to investigate trends and patterns of Market Power throughout 
various supply chains, countries and time periods, using the metanalysis approach. Our study 
has three main objectives: (1) provide an overview of the recent empirical MP studies related 
to agriculture and food supply chains, (2) investigate the underlying industry-specific 
determinants related to MP estimates. 
This paper is organised as follows: first, we describe data collected as well as dependent 
and independent variables that are used in our analysis, then we discuss the results and the 
last chapter brings the conclusions. 
2 Data and Methods 
Our data is based on the level of processors’ market power estimates collected from 52 
recently published papers. To the best of our knowledge, we collected the most 
comprehensive list of studies investigating processors’ MP in the agri-food supply chains 
compiled in recent years. All of the studies focus on the estimation of a Market Power Index 
(MPI) related to a specific approach, sector, the direction of MP, product etc. In total, in our 
analysis, we use 472 unique MPI estimates (Table 1). 
We employed four linear models estimated via OLS and one robust linear model to 
analyse the level of MP estimates between most dominate estimation approaches and the 
determinants of MP estimates. 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is a Market Power Index that can be described in the following 
way: when the market is competitive, the product price equals marginal costs (MC), so the 
mark-up component is zero. However, in a situation with market power, the literature has 
focused on the identification of monopoly pricing from the evidence that output price (P) 
exceeds the marginal cost. Traditionally MC is calculated from an estimated cost function. 
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Mark-up is then derived from (P - MC) /MC, a positive value of mark-up indicates the 
presence of non-competitive behaviour in the market. The higher the mark-up is, the greater 
is the degree of market power or, in other words, the market is closer to monopoly [21]. We 
use log-transformed MPIs as a dependent variable in throughout our analysis. Log 
transformation was done to alleviate heteroscedasticity issues and to ameliorate the 
interpretation of the results.  










(Ahn and Lee, 2010) GIM Oligopoly Yearly 1975-2002 1 
(Anders, 2008) GIM Oligopsony Monthly 1995-2000 2 
(Anders, 2008) GIM Oligopoly Monthly 1995-2000 2 
(Appelbaum, 1982) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1947–1971 2 
(Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1990) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1959-1982 1 
(Azzam and Pagoulatos, 1990) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1959-1982 1 
(Bakucs et al., 2009) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1993-2003 1 
(Bakucs et al., 2009) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1995-2004 1 
(Bergman and Brannlund, 1995) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1960-1988 1 
(Bettendorf and Verboven, 
2000) 
GIM Oligopoly Monthly 1992-1996 1 
(Bhuyan and Lopez, 1997) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1972-1987 3 
(Bhuyan and Lopez, 1998) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1972-1987 38 
(Čechura, Kroupová and 
Hockmann, 2015) 
SFE Oligopoly Yearly 2003-2012 25 
(Chen and Yu, 2018) GIM Oligopsony Monthly 2008-2016 1 
(Chidmi, Lopez and Cotterill, 
2005) 
GIM Oligopoly Monthly 1996-2000 1 
(Chirinko and Fazzari, 1994) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1973-1986 1 
(Chirinko and Fazzari, 1994) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1973-1987 1 
(Mello and Brandao, 1999) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1962-1991 1 
(Genesove and Mullin, 1998) GIM Oligopoly Yearly 1890-1914 1 
(Hockmann and Vöneki, 2009) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1998-2006 1 
(Hovhannisyan and Gould, 
2012) 
GIM Oligopoly Weekly 2001-2006 1 
(Ji and Chung, 2016) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1980-2009 1 
(Kumbhakar, Baardsen and 
Lien, 2012) 
SFE Oligopoly Yearly 1974-1991 2 
(Lopez, 1984) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1965-1979 1 
(Lopez and You, 1993) GIM Oligopsony Yearly 1954-1984 1 
(Lopez and Azzam, 2002) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1972-1997 25 
(Lopez, He and Azzam, 2018) SFE Oligopoly Yearly 1990-2010 23 
(Čechura, Kroupová and 
Hockmann, 2015) 
SFE Oligopsony Yearly 2003-2012 94 
(Čechura, Kroupová and 
Hockmann, 2015) 
SFE Oligopoly Yearly 2003-2012 70 
(Mei and Sun, 2008) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1955-2003 1 
(Mei and Sun, 2008) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1955-2003 1 
(Merel, 2009) GIM Oligopoly Quarterly 1985-2005 1 
(Millán, 1999) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1978-1992 14 
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(Murray, 1995) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1958-1988 1 
(Murray, 1995) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1958-1989 1 
(Muth and Wohlgenant, 1999) GIM Oligopsony Yearly 1967-1993 1 
(O’Donnell et al., 2007) GIM Oligopsony Yearly 1989-2000 28 
(O’Donnell et al., 2007) GIM Oligopoly Yearly 1989-2000 12 
(Panagiotou and Stavrakoudis, 
2017) 
SFE Oligopsony Yearly 1970-2009 1 
(Panagiotou and Stavrakoudis, 
2018) 
SFE Oligopsony Yearly 1970-2009 2 
(Panagiotou, 2019) SFE Oligopsony Yearly 1970-2010 3 
(Perekhozhuk et al., 2013) PTA Oligopsony Yearly 1993-2006 2 
(Perekhozhuk et al., 2015) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1996-2003 1 
(Perekhozhuk et al., 2016) GIM Oligopsony Monthly 1996-2003 1 
(Perekhozhuk et al., 2016) PTA Oligopsony Monthly 1996-2003 8 
(Lopez, Zheng and Azzam, 
2015) 
SFE Oligopoly Yearly 1979-2009 36 
(Salhofer, Tribl and Sinabell, 
2012) 
GIM Oligopsony Monthly 1997-2008 1 
(Salhofer, Tribl and Sinabell, 
2012) 
GIM Oligopoly Monthly 1997-2008 1 
(Bhuyan and Lopez, 1997) PTA Oligopoly Yearly 1972-1987 37 
(Scalco and Braga, 2014) GIM Oligopsony Yearly 1997-2011 1 
(Scalco, Lopez and He, 2017) SFE Oligopsony Monthly 2010-2015 1 
(Scalco, Lopez and He, 2017) SFE Oligopoly Monthly 2010-2015 1 
(Silva et al., 2019) PTA Oligopsony Quarterly 2016-2017 2 
(Stalgienė and Jedik, 2015) PTA Oligopsony Quarterly 2004-2014 3 
(Suzuki, Lenz and Forker, 1993) GIM Oligopoly Yearly 1979-1989 1 
(Weerahewa, 2003) GIM Oligopsony Yearly 1970-2000 3 
(Weerahewa, 2003) GIM Oligopoly Yearly 1970-2000 3 
Total     472 
Source: Articles cited, Note: the number of MPI depends on the number of supply chains analysed in the study 
Independent variables 
The first independent variable used in our analysis is “Observation number” variable 
calculated as the observation period multiplied with the data frequency (Table 1). We 
hypothesise that the higher number of observations used the lower average MP level is. For 
the analysis, we created “After 2005” dummy, to check if there is any difference in reported 
MP levels between older and newer papers. Also, we created Yearly dummy variables. This 
group of variables is aimed to capture variations of the observation frequency, which were 
used to estimate MPI. In the majority of the studies, data with yearly frequency was used for 
the MP estimation. The next variable is related to the approach used, namely: GIM, PTA and 
SFE (base factor). Another group of dummy variables are “Oligopsony” and “Oligopoly” 
which capture the direction of MP (input or output). The next group of the independent 
variables is based on the industry analysed. For our analysis, we grouped all observations in 
8 main groups which have at least ten observations. As can be seen from Table 2, almost 20% 
of all MPI observations are attributed to the “Dairy” sector, which includes milk, cheeses, 
butter, and other dairy products. “Beverages” dummy includes all the observations related 
to tea, coffee, wine, water, beer etc. Studies related to beef, hog or poultry, slaughtering are 
grouped in the “Meat” dummy. The Cereals category include observations which contain 
MPI of wheat, barley, oat and other grains. Most of the observations in this group can be 
attributed to the article by O’Donnell et al. [33]. The Oils group include observations of 
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canola and other oils. “Tobacco”, and “Fruits and Vegetables” variables are self-descriptive. 
Finally, Other industry consists of all other observations which cannot be included in any of 
the beforementioned groups; it also serves as a base group in the regression. Each of the 
beforementioned groups is used as a binary variable in further analysis.  
The next variable is based on a geographical factor. Most of the studies were concluded 
using the data from the USA and other western countries. There is a relatively limited number 
of papers related to developing countries. Therefore, for our analysis, we decided to use 
regional dummy variables: USA, Europe and Other. First one includes all of the observations 
from the USA. The second variable contains countries of the European Economic Area. 
Furthermore, the “Other” dummy variable will consist of all other countries; also, it will 
serve as a base group to compare results with other variables. 
Finally, we created the dummy variable “perishable” associated with the products with a 
short level of storability (eg. fluid milk, fresh meat etc.). The summary statistics of all 
variables can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
MPI 0.140 0.121 0.007 0.064 0.179 0.815 
Observations number 19.874 25.987 4 9 20 348 
After 2005 0.706 0.456 0 0 1 1 
Yearly 0.935 0.247 0 1 1 1 
Oligopsony 0.349 0.477 0 0 1 1 
Oligopoly 0.651 0.477 0 0 1 1 
Meat 0.166 0.372 0 0 0 1 
Tobacco 0.024 0.153 0 0 0 1 
Beverages 0.081 0.273 0 0 0 1 
Dairy 0.198 0.399 0 0 0 1 
Oils 0.048 0.214 0 0 0 1 
Fruits and Vegetables 0.122 0.328 0 0 0 1 
Cereals 0.176 0.382 0 0 0 1 
Other industry 0.185 0.389 0 0 0 1 
Europe 0.460 0.499 0 0 1 1 
USA 0.407 0.492 0 0 1 1 
Other countries 0.133 0.340 0 0 0 1 
GIM 0.118 0.323 0 0 0 1 
PTA 0.320 0.467 0 0 1 1 
SFE 0.562 0.497 0 0 1 1 
Perishable 0.484 0.500 0 0 1 1 
Source: Articles cited 
3 Results and Discussion 
Based on the data introduced in the previous section, we developed four linear models which 
were estimated via OLS. In the first model (1) we included all variables related to the 
approach used and type of market power used in a study and the dummy “After 2005”. 
Variables SFE and Oligopoly serve as a base group; therefore, the coefficients in each group 
can be compared with them. The second model (2) contains all the variables from the first 
and also variables related to data frequency of and geographical information of the MPI. 
Finally, the last model (3) includes all the data from previous models but also the information 
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related to the industry in which MPI were observed. The last OLS model (4) also includes 
“perishability” dummy.  
It should be noted that in the OLS models (1-4) from the initial dataset, we excluded 12 
outliers which made OLS models less stable and might influence the reliability of the 
estimates. However, since those data points are not data entry errors, neither they are from a 
different population than most of our data. Therefore, we had no compelling reason to 
exclude these data points from our analysis entirely. Hence, this motivated us to make use of 
robust regression (5) [17] to be able to incorporate all the data into the model and to compare 
the results with the OLS estimates. The statistics of all five models can be seen in Table 3. 
In all of the model, we used the log transformation of our dependent variable. It should 
be noted that even after the log transformation of the dependent variable, we could still reject 
the homoscedasticity hypothesis using Breusch Pagan Test. Thus, all the standard errors and 
marks of the statistical significance in Table 3 use these robust standard errors. The residual-
based diagnostic tests proved the stability of all models. 
Table 3. Regression Results 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -2.078*** -0.272 -0.546 -0.419 0.186 
 (0.159) (0.642) (0.643) (0.642) (0.659) 
PTA 0.350* 0.404 0.462* 0.465* 0.609** 
 (0.152) (0.232) (0.235) (0.234) (0.214) 
GIM -0.606*** -0.391 -0.363 -0.375 -0.115 
 (0.163) (0.221) (0.222) (0.220) (0.214) 
After 2005 -0.305 -0.130 -0.067 -0.080 0.039 
 (0.163) (0.237) (0.245) (0.244) (0.227) 
Oligopsony -0.023 0.008 -0.008 -0.004 -0.107 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.058) 
Obs. Num. (log)  -0.546*** -0.539*** -0.540*** -0.682*** 
  (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.129) 
Yearly  -0.788** -0.760** -0.783** -0.945** 
  (0.282) (0.279) (0.279) (0.303) 
USA  0.548** 0.607** 0.542** 0.499** 
  (0.182) (0.187) (0.188) (0.188) 
Europe  0.014 0.007 0.004 -0.081 
  (0.157) (0.155) (0.154) (0.135) 
Meat   0.191 0.565*** 0.600** 
   (0.127) (0.169) (0.192) 
Tobacco   0.443* 0.397 0.285 
   (0.208) (0.207) (0.195) 
Beverages   0.222 0.170 0.123 
   (0.164) (0.166) (0.152) 
Dairy   0.145 0.473** 0.485** 
   (0.133) (0.163) (0.188) 
Oils   -0.100 -0.147 -0.341 
   (0.171) (0.175) (0.188) 
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Fruits   0.167 0.529** 0.594** 
   (0.142) (0.173) (0.189) 
Cereals   0.247 0.170 0.005 
   (0.148) (0.156) (0.132) 
Perishable    -0.450** -0.583** 
    (0.168) (0.185) 
Observations 459 459 459 459 472 
R-squared 0.231 0.295 0.311 0.321  
Residual standard error 0.700 0.673 0.671 0.667 0.548 
F statistic 34.134*** 23.535*** 13.346*** 13.072***  
Notes: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05 
First and foremost, let us review methodology related variables, which are PTA and GIM. 
It should be noted that there is indeed a systematic difference between the approach used and 
an MP estimate. Most of the models suggest that PTA estimates, provide 40% higher MP 
estimates than GIM and SFE (which is a base group). We perceive the last two models as 
more reliable and descriptive since they take into account more nuances. Therefore, 
according to our analysis, we can conclude that PTA studies tend to report a higher level of 
MP than other two methods. At the same time, there is no statistically significant difference 
between GIM and SFE. From our study, we cannot conclude which estimates are more 
“correct” and reliable. We can only state that there is a systematic difference in the estimates.  
Another notable finding is that there is a high and consistent correlation between a number 
of observations used for MP estimation with the reported results. According to our analysis, 
we can say that increase in the number of observations by 1% on average decrease MPI on 
approximately 0.54%. This observation might be explained that articles with a small sample 
size are more likely to report an extreme level of MP and vice versa. At the same time, studies 
with Yearly data frequency tend to report around 75% lower MPI estimates than studies with 
more frequent data. In other words, a long observation period used in a study, on average, 
provide significantly lower estimates, which may occur due to the regression toward the mean 
effect.  
It should also be noted that there is a dramatical difference between the average level of 
MP in the USA and other countries. According to our analysis articles based on US data, on 
average, report 60% higher MP level as in other countries. At the same time, there is no 
evidence that there is a statistically significant difference between Europe and other 
countries.  
At the same time, we can reject the hypothesis of difference in MP estimate in older and 
newer articles, the variable After 2005 does not differ from zero in any of the models. There 
is also no statistically significant difference between Oligopoly and Oligopsony MP 
estimates. 
Among all of the industry variables, without including perishable dummy, we can say 
that only MPIs related to Tobacco systematically higher than industry groups. However, after 
the addition variable, which captures the perishability of a product, the results change 
significantly. With controlling for perishability, we can say that on average, meat, milk and 
horticulture industries have around 50% higher market power that other agricultural supply 
chains. Another interesting finding is that perishable goods turn out to be quite strongly 
negatively correlated with the level of market power. This result is a little unexpected since 
the traditional microeconomic theory suggests the opposite correlation direction. 
Understanding the reason why happens so is yet to be understood and requires further 
investigation.  
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The results of a robust regression are in line with the other OLS models, even though 
some coefficients vary slightly, both the direction and magnitude of correlations are virtually 
the same. The r square statistic is not reported for the fifth model since it is not appropriate 
directly compare this statistic in robust regression with the one in OLS. However, smaller 
residual standard error suggests a slightly better fit of the robust regression.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that taking into account the considerable data limitations, 
the results of this analysis should be perceived with high caution. This paper is just a first 
attempt to understand the underlying mechanism of market power formation, and by all 
means, it requires a further extension. In future, this research can be extended by including 
proxies of organisational structures, barriers to entry, supply chain structure and other 
variables to examine the relationship between market structure and the level of market power.  
4 Conclusion 
This paper aims to investigate the systematic differences in market power estimates 
between agriculture supply chains and to assess the determinants of market power estimates. 
We employed a meta-analysis approach and using linear models and robust linear regression 
we estimated the impact of the estimation method and additional variables on the market 
power index obtained in up to date published studies. According to our analysis, we can 
conclude that PTA studies tend to report a higher level of MP than other two methods. At the 
same time, there is no statistically significant difference between GIM and SFE. We can also 
conclude that increase in the number of observations by 1% on average decrease MPI on 
approximately 0.54%. Usage of Yearly data frequency in estimation is associated with a 75% 
decrease in the derived MPI estimate, compared to monthly or weekly data frequency. 
Having all other variables fixed, articles based on US data report 60% higher MP level as in 
other countries; however, there is no evidence of the statistically significant difference 
between Europe and other countries. The level of market power, on average, is 50% higher 
in meat, dairy and horticulture industries. The final finding is that perishable products have 
a lower average level of market power. 
We gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the Slovak Research and Development 
Agency under the contract No. APVV-18-0512 (Slovak Republic) and GAČR project 19-18080S 
(Czechia). 
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